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disClosure interviews Christopher Newfield 
dC: Could you start by summarizing the idea of liberal racism that in-
forms much of your work? 
CN: Most basically, liberal racism refers to attitudes and actions that 
look antiracist or at least race-neutral on the surface but that have racist 
effects. It opposes explicit discrimination on the basis of race or color, 
and rejects simple white supremacism of a kind that says members of 
other racial groups are inferior to whites. But it supports systems that 
favor whites over most other groups when those systems don't use 
color but some other factor like "merit" to make their decisions. And 
since explicit white supremacy is less common today than it was even 
thirty years ago, liberal racism is becoming a more important way of 
maintaining racial inequality. 
Liberal racism has been around a long time, since 1820 or 1830 at 
least. One of its crucial sources was abolitionism. Most abolitionists 
wanted to end slavery for various good reasons but could not imagine 
that there was any biological or cultural basis for black/white equality. 
Liberal racism favors the reduction of cruelty and even exploitation 
while maintaining an understanding of racial rankings in which whites 
are on top. Abolitionism was of course a courageous and invaluable po-
sition, but the attitudes on which it usually rested did not achieve 
post-slavery racial equality in large part because they didn't want racial 
equality. Only a small group of "radical .reconstructionists" imagined 
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social equality between the races. This aversion to full equality is a ma-
jor reason why we have not yet completed racial reconstruction over 
130 years after the end of the Civil War. People always say "getting rid 
of prejudice takes time." That's true, especially when they're still hang-
ing on to it. 
There's another important meaning of the term liberal racism-as a 
form of what Avery Gordon and I called "white philosophy." Liberals 
sometimes say to racialized groups, "well, it's not that we think your 
way of life is deficient, we aren't getting into that question. What's defi-
cient is your belief about your identity, about your status as a socially 
marked racial group. It's biased and irrational." The liberal racist 
doesn't claim a cultural superiority to the racialized group. He claims 
that the group's claim to be a group is a conceptual mistake. This is a 
managerial position-it manages other groups in the name of reason 
while claiming its own neutrality; it rejects attempts to correct for racial 
inequality; it says that race is not only a biological but a social fiction, 
and a racist one at that. Jim Crow racism was good for keeping black 
folks out of restaurants and denying them the vote. Liberal racism is 
good for maintaining racial stratification in integrated corporations. 
In at least one way, liberal racism is worse than the old cultural 
supremacism. The old form may have thought that African American 
cultures were deficient-to stick with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s ex-
ample-but agreed that they had the right to identify themselves and 
define themselves as distinct. The managerial version says they don't 
have the right to define themselves as a culturally or historically or so-
cially distinct group-that this is an irrational return to biological no-
tions of identity. What Gordon and I call white philosophy-claiming 
itself to be colorblind and universally rational- asserts the right of its 
own philosophical arguments not only to evaluate but to deny the ex-
istence of these other groups. 
Look at the attacks on affirmative action. Many of its opponents say 
that any kind of awareness of race as a social fact is philosophically 
wrong and itself racist. They therefore don't have to discuss the social 
inequality that led to affirmative action in the first place. They don't 
have to get into a complex conversation about which programs did and 
didn't work, how much, and for whom. This is liberal racism in both 
senses I've just described. It consents to racial inequality-says it's a 
less important problem than race consciousness. And it asserts the right 
unilaterally to set the terms of debate, to decide what categories are in 
and out, which identities are allowable and which are not, whose inju-
ries matter more than others, and all this regardless of what other in-
volved people think and want. 
The journalist Jim Sleeper has written a book arguing that only 
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colorblindness, willful blindness to socially-defined race, avoids rac-
ism. He calls race consciousness "liberal racism." Don't be fooled by 
this misuse of the term! Sleeper's position is itself liberal racism, in the 
two senses I've described-the acceptance of white social superiority, 
and the assertion of the wholesale superiority of color-blind axioms to 
the self-understandings of other groups. 
dC: In your book, you note that "Emerson adheres to notions of 
herrenvolk democracy among the best white strains, but he does not 
only invoke race as a foundation of English superiority for he uses race 
to install corporate democracy." To what extent do you see Emerson's 
political ideology as having influenced the current relationship of race 
and corporate hierarchy in America? 
CN: Well, that passage refers to Emerson's understanding of English-
ness and intra-white mixing-the mixing of Saxons with Angles, 
Welsh, Scots, and other indigenous groups, all of whom are "white." 
The English nation was an amalgamation of conquest, as Emerson ob-
serves, and he uses the concept of race as a way to homogenize and 
unify as "English" what are culturally antagonistic groups of white 
people. "Race" establishes the whiteness of English people and thereby 
eliminates internal differences and internal conflict about fundamental 
cultural practices. The result is that quotation marks are no longer nec-
essary around "English"- it's no longer an artificial construct or ac-
cepted fiction but a stable, coherent identity and a unified culture. 
Emerson can then call his book English Traits without apologetics and 
winking. 
English Traits was published in 1856 and went into a second edition 
that same year. By that time anti-slavery forces-Emerson among 
them-are facing the prospect of dividing the country. England is an 
initially divided country that became the most powerful nation in the 
world. So the principle of English unity would naturally arouse great 
interest in a United States that is starting to come apart. When Emerson 
links English race to English nation, he establishes a very flexible, al-
most cultural understanding of race as the unifying principle of the na-
tion. He makes race in this sense more important as the ground of 
nationhood and national life than parliament, the public, or the crown 
itself. 
What this means is that a proper nation is a nation that unites 
around the similar instincts, fundamental values, core impulses, habits 
of mind and world view that are associated with a particular race. This 
resonates with all sorts of longings in Americans for a national identity 
that will survive the slavery controversy by offering a kind of cultural 
homogeneity, one which is always being confused with racial homoge-
neity. This idea of the national citizen omits slaves and the later 
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racialized freedpersons-they can be present, they can work and be 
paid, but though free they can't become national citizens in the deep 
psycho-cultural sense. 
We still live in the post-Civil War period. In the late 1980s and 
1990s, the ruckus about multiculturalism raised the same issue. What if 
we have several American cultures? People like Schlesinger predicted 
the "disuniting" of the nation itself. This bad debate has been all such a 
lost opportunity. We excel at segregation-Indian reservations, barrios, 
ethnic enclaves. We could have started to figure out how to have some 
kind of federated system, some interdependent independence for vol-
untarily self-identified groups. We could explore how mobile and mul-
tiple people's group identities are. We could explore how group 
boundaries overlap and shift. We could work on really bringing in ev-
erybody in the multiracial, culturally contradictory, multinational, 
even multicontinental nation we've always been, or on really leaving 
them alone. How do you share resources, understand, respect, or in-
clude people in a country where, for example, 70 to 100 languages are 
spoken in the homes of the students of the Los Angeles "Unified" 
School District? This is an enormous and exciting challenge. The 21st 
century will turn on our success or failure with it. But instead we've 
mostly heard versions of the Emerson-like idea that a true nation rests 
on a quasi-racial cultural unity, and we've heard versions of an idea 
Emerson would reject-that America is really English. We're quite 
stuck, I think. 
dC: So, if you take out Emerson's idea of race as the unifying principle, 
then are you saying we don' t need any type of primary system of unity 
or something else that unifies us? 
CN: I'm saying unity is overrated. It's not necessary. Cultural and po-
litical systems hang together through successful negotiation. All human 
systems are heterogeneous in fact, and none are actually ruled by a uni-
fying law. People who call for adherence to a unifying law are usually 
calling for adherence to their law. We know this in personal relation-
ships. Marriage vows don't say "and as you are joined at the altar on 
this day so shall you be joined unto death." There is no marriage consti-
tution, and the vows are flexible, they are interp reted. She plays golf; he 
watches movies. Or she gardens and he writes detective novels. The 
whole idea that difference is anarchy is ridiculous. Oppression, unjust 
misery, p rejudice, exploitation-they can create anarchy, and that is 
sometimes preferable. But the presence of difference and interpretation 
do not. We even know this about the law- one of our three branches of 
government does reinterpretation of the law full-time. The executive, 
the legislative, the interpretive: these are our three branches. We nego-
tiate in love, in business and in law. Why would negotiating cultures 
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uniquely bring us to the brink of war? 
I think that as demographics change, as economic relationships 
change, as the economy changes, racial deals have to be able to change. 
So the deal in the 70s about h igher education in California, which is a 
situation I'm involved in, has to be redone. Now, over fifty percent of 
the graduates of California high schools are people of color. That means 
we have to re-imagine what the University of California is going to look 
like and do. So far, I think the way we're responding is to withdraw. 
"Well, you know, if Berkeley's freshman class, in 1994, is only 1/ 3 
white, which was indeed the case, then should we, the white taxpayers 
of California, really be spending so much money on it? Now that its 
somebody else's Un iversity, like all those rich Asians?" I think that's 
the unspoken, unconscious kind of thought some people have. And if 
we establish the principle - this isn' t going to do it automatically -
but if we establish the principle that social relationships are negotiable, 
and must be re-negotiated from a position of respect and mutual inter-
action and relative equity in the power of the people at the table, then 
we can talk about those things w ithout the same kinds of phobias. So I 
don't argue that if we engage in, recognize renegotiation, we'll get rid 
of Anglo anxieties about the color of Berkeley, because that is inevi-
table. But I do think that we can at least acknowledge the racial anxiety 
and have a more honest discussion abou t living and sharing resources 
in a changing world. 
dC: You note the civil anxiety of ou r times. Recent scholarship on the 
colonial nation has suggested that the unified picture that we see of 
them is a construct, that there is really a lot of d isunity and argument in 
this attempt at negotiation that you're talking about. Yet your descrip-
tion of Emerson places h im as a central figure around which society 
seems to unify. Is it that by Emerson we don't have that negotiation 
anymore or d oes Emerson codify the debate? 
CN: Here's the power of Emerson. He codifies the law in the moment of 
individual emancipation from it. This is the tricky thing. Lots of people 
came along before and after and said, "authority, hierarchy, listen to 
your masters, listen to you r elders, listen to your ministers, we must 
have obedience and deference to have a society." This was a truism in 
the New England that Emerson grew up in. This is the kind of thing 
that is really easy to rebel against because it's openly controlling, it's 
openly elitist, it has open contempt for mass democracy, and it openly 
disavows respect for the masses, who it sees as essentially mediocre. 
Democracy and mediocrity, for New England's elites, are the same 
thing. 
Emerson wanted to figure out what to do with the people who are 
not right a t the top. That's what democracy is all about - figuring out 
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how the U.S. is going to be their. country. They're the vast majority; they 
live here; they do most of the work; they' re the ones that the country fi-
nally has to be able to grow with and for. So, Emerson understood a lot 
of this; he was extremely shrewd about the problems with that simple 
deference culture of which his father was part. He hated it on some 
level, and you know this is part of my real attraction to him, my ongo-
ing attraction to him. He thought it was suffocating and controlling and 
he really disliked Unitarian church doctrine for having an utterly 
wishy-washy understanding of freedom. He's the guy from whom I 
learned the problem with halfway covenants - that's an allusion to the 
controversies in the 1660s and 1670s where the congregationalist 
church was opened up to membership for the "non-elect" without al-
lowing the non-elect to have governing power. That's the primal semi-
democratic American compromise. We can't just keep them out, so 
we're going to let them in but we're not going to give them ruling au-
thority. 
What Emerson did was recognize that Unitarianism in the early 
nineteenth century was still a halfway covenant. But then he broke with 
it. His famous line is, if our heart should guide our interpretation of 
scripture as the Unitarians believed, if we don't need church leadership 
to lead our readings, why not go to our own hearts first? That is the 
great antinomian impulse in America Protestantism that I've always 
liked. Emerson takes it to the next level. But then he sets up his own 
compromise. His power comes from saying, have self-reliance, trust 
thyself, open yourself to your impulses, be all that you can be, free the 
real power that is you on the inside, and then at the same time, in that 
same instant, reconnect the liberatory moment to a source in higher law 
than the liberated individual. Emerson follows a three-step movement: 
over and over and over he proclaims individual liberation; then he 
moves to a second step, how this connects up with other people, his 
democratic stand; then he takes the third step, which folds both of those 
things, individual emancipation and group emancipation, into a meta-
physical and eternal foundation. 
The reason I think he's so influential is that he's so great at wedding 
opposite things. You get emancipation and s·ubmission at the same 
time. Freedom means not full self-direction, but blessed confirmation 
by a higher power. That's why I call it submissive individualism. 
The attraction of this subjectivity is you can feel like you're rebel-
ling, yet you don't actually have to. I think this is the baseline identity 
of the white collar, white middle class culture that was just beginning 
to form after the Civil War through new professions and new corporate 
structures. It produces people like us, like me. 
When I was in high school, I was supposed to become a physician, 
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but I decided I didn't want to do that for various reasons. Mostly the 
reason was that my biology and physics classes had absolutely nothing 
to do with me, with emotional turmoil, with this whole level of reality 
that seemed irrational, psychological, irresistible. It had to be known. I 
stopped taking science and I switched into the humanities, and for a 
long time my inevitable destiny was to be a writer. I didn't know what 
that meant because I grew up in a middle class family where the only 
viable means of staying in the middle class was to become a profes-
sional. 
So, I had this weird hybridized dual consciousness about what I 
was supposed to be. I was this agonistic young Byron, who wrote end-
lessly in my journal in my bedroom and would get really upset when 
my mother interrupted me to do chores or to come to dinner because I 
was making art understood as passionate self-expression. Then, look 
what actually happened. I went to graduate school, not in creative writ-
ing, but to become a teacher, and became profoundly bureaucratized. I 
became a middle manager; that's what I am today. I am like a line su-
pervisor in a large corporation where the vast majority of my working 
life is not about passionate self-expression, really funky experience, 
weird traveling all over the place, living like Tom Waits in fleabag ho-
tels, meeting the restless of the earth and telling great stories about the 
margins. I deal with the center. I deal with middle class kids who go to 
a state school and want to become professionals and I teach them how 
to be good, professional bureaucrats like me, meaning not totally re-
pressed, but at the same time having good skills, good self-discipline, 
and good self-management techniques. So, I'm still living this double 
life and that's also what I teach. 
In the fifties, we would have called this " the gray flannel rebel." The 
man had a nine to five job that paid a nice middle class salary so that he 
could support a family in a really nice house with a back yard and they 
could take vacations. He would go and push paper during the day, and 
then every night he would come home, knock back a couple martinis, 
and complain sardonically about how superior he was to life with the 
schmucks at the office. Then the next morning, he'd wake up with a 
little hangover and go back to the office and be one of the schmucks he 
despised, come back, complain about it. He never quit his job, never ac-
tually wrote the great American novel, but perpetually thought about 
and lived out the contradiction between those two roles. And only one 
of them existed in the world. 
This is part of Emerson's legacy that still needs to be dealt with. 
This performative yet disavowed conformity is a major psychologized 
barrier to the kind of racial negotiation and man's democracy we dis-
cussed before. 
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dC: Keeping in mind how Emerson helped construct a socio-political 
way for us both to admit and ignore things at the same time and the 
current theoretical move to examine whiteness as an unconsciousness 
ideology that structures our current socio-political system, how do you 
believe becoming aware of whiteness as race, as a color, might allow us 
to attack the liberal racist system? 
CN: I don't think awareness of whiteness in itself does anything, one 
way or the other. The Klan is really aware of its whiteness. Middle-class 
awareness of whiteness could mean thinking, "I'm really aware that 
I'm getting screwed by all these affirmative action babies." So, there has 
to be some awareness of subtler forms of white racial anxiety, of how 
race structures so many social things. The current context makes that 
hard. Someone writes a new white backlash book every fifteen minutes. 
They all say white racism doesn't really exist, except in the form of anti-
discrimination programs. Whiteness studies has its work cut out for it. 
dC: Right now in the United States, whiteness is the norm and "other" 
races are invested with color. For example, even the phrase "people of 
color" as used to designated non-white races reinforces the primacy of 
whiteness and erases the racial status of "white." So, becoming aware 
of the subtle yet fundamental ways in which the primacy of whiteness 
structures our society- recognizing whiteness as property in addition 
to ~eing a racial affiliation - becomes essential to recognizing white 
racism. 
CN: Yes, I think that's very important. I also think that it has to be 
coupled with two other things, so it's actually triple consciousness. The 
first is a critique of subtle racism; the second is the retrieval of historical 
examples, of multi-racial work; and the third is a more utopian move-
~ent beyond precedent toward new forms of non-unifying collabora-
tion. 
I think that we have to do more work on retrieving historical mo-
ments in which the white working class is not simply racist, in which 
the Irish resisted becoming white if it meant attacking Black folks, or in 
which unions did produce cross racial solidarities that were successful 
for a long time. For example, there's the longshoreman's union that a 
scholar named David Wellman talked about at the Berkeley conference. 
It was based in San Francisco and actually did manage to organize a 
very multiracial, not just black/white, but a multiracial group of long-
shoreman by submerging white consciousness in labor issues. I think 
that that sort of memory is really crucial. 
I also think that it will involve - and this is going to be a very pain-
ful ~roc~ss - thinking a?out viable forms of white racial identity. I 
don t thmk that you can simply replace racial identity with some other 
form of identity like class consciousness. This was a big desire at the 
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whit~ness conferenc~. Some. participants wanted to say, okay, here's 
the big story of race in America, racial ideology was used to split white 
working class off from upper class people. They weren' t mad at their 
white betters because they got mad at poor Black people instead. So, 
what we have to do, this argument continues, is eliminate that false ra-
cial consciousness and replace it with a true class consciousness. I don't 
buy the initial scenario, generally speaking. Most whites were indi-
vidualistic and pro-capitalist. They had economic views that blocked 
class consciousness. And they didn' t simply swallow racism as a mis-
take. They were racist for a variety of reasons, including their esteem 
for white ethnic identity. 
I also .thin~ that you. can't ~imply take away what is really a complex 
cultural identity that is van egated and heterogeneous for d ifferent 
kinds of white people and say that you now have to have a class con-
sciousness instead of that. You can work with the multiple identities 
that people have, with the knowledge that there are many identities 
tha~ ~hite folks live w i.th on a daily basis and then try to pull out the 
positive forms of ethnic and racial awareness that exist and couple 
~hem.up w ith other identities that you are trying to reinforce, like an 
identity as a w orker. I'm really interested in economic literacy. I think 
that most people are economically undereducated in the United States 
and don't - can' t - fully analyze what's going on, so I'd like to see 
how changing that would actually fit with talking through coercive, 
c?nstrictive racial identities, not into a non-racial identity, a non-white 
~md of thing, but in to a non-racist, economically skeptical and idealis-
tic awareness of one's racial placement in society. 
dC: So, you would disagree with David Roediger when he argues for 
the abolition of whiteness. Would you argue that that is not a viable 
option or even a productive one? 
CN: I totally sympathize w ith the impulse that lies behind that. I also 
~hare his interest in class politics. All groups need to start understand-
ing better when the economy is not being run for them, so that there's a 
revival of an understanding of what's really going on economically and 
who's doing it and who's benefi ting from it, and so on. I think that's 
ab.solutely crucial. I just don't join it to racism in quite the same way. I 
thmk post-capitalism and post-whiteness are linked but separate 
projects. The links need to be constructed. There's no automatic connec-
tion. That is, anti-racism and class consciousness interact historically, 
but they have to be pursued on a double track. 
I think the two subjects will always be talked about in sort of inter-
active way, where for example, you start asking people why they feel 
that they shouldn' t support certain kinds of sodal programs because 
they are failures. But why do they think these programs have failed? If 
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you ask a white person, you almost always get a discourse about unde-
serving people who abuse lenient programs. If you ask, "Wouldn't you 
be better off if we had social development monitored by a federal gov-
ernment that would actually support your retraining," for example, 
and they say, "No, because I don't like social programs," and then you 
argue that they don't like social programs partly because they think 
that the people who benefit from these are undeserving, and then you 
further suggest that they assume that most of those people are Black 
and Mexican American, you are inevitably intertwining economics 
with race. But, I don't think that getting people to be more anti-racist 
makes them anti-capitalist or anti-elite, or more socially democratic. I 
just don't see a simple connection between those two. That, to me, feels 
like a wishful displacement of the categories. 
I should also say that I don't know what it would mean to abolish 
whiteness. I don't think that that's even possible. I would like to break 
whiteness down into these different components and talk about the 
components. I'm interested in the forms that white supremacy inhabits 
today, the subtler ones. My own work- partly because of where I am 
placed socially- concentrates on middle class forms of racial thinking, 
and professional ones, ones that inhabit my own workplace in universi-
ties and corporate structures. If you could say, well, to get rid of white-
ness means bolstering white people's desire for interracial and 
interclass equality, I'd say great, but I don't know that the word white-
ness can be used for that. I think you have to talk more directly about 
things like equality, racial equality. Let's have equality of racial out-
comes. Why can't we talk about that? . 
For me, the question is really simple: let's figure out how we have to 
structure the economy so that there are not these grotesque differences 
in economic resources of, say, African-Americans and whites. When 
you've discovered that the average household wealth for white Ameri-
cans is $44, 000 and the average household wealth for Black Americans 
is $4,000, you can say, okay, this is a problem that we actually have 
ways to fix. I would like to talk to people more about why they think 
it's okay for these major discrepancies to exist and then work through 
the reasons they give, like they are lazy, or less educated, or they're cul-
turally deficient, or whatever. Try to get to some other position. But my 
goal is not abolishing whiteness, my goal is racial equality. 
dC: You've talked in the past few minutes about social programs, and 
in your 1994 MLA convention talk, "The Genesis of Liberal Racism," 
you argue that in order to replace liberal racism, "we must sever merit 
from hierarchy." So, to look at a specific social program, can this be ac-
complished within the framework of Affirmative Action, or will we 
need to formulate a new system and, if so, where might we go? 
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CN: Yes, we do need to formulate a new system. The Affirmative Ac-
tion that was developed in the University of California and other uni-
versities assumes that there is a conflict between Affirmative Action 
and rigorous meritocracy. The corollary assumption is that there is a 
co~~lict betwe:n racia~ integration and rigorous meritocracy. The im-
plicit assumption behind that is a conflict between the admission of 
people of color and high standards, that whenever people of color are 
l~t in, you are lowering the standards. This is based pretty much en-
tirely on ag~regate averages for test scores of the different groups that 
enter. Even In the 60s and 70s, no one tried to build a system based on a 
broader understanding of the meaning of merit. Affirmative Action is a 
symptom of a narrow, test-based notion of merit. Affirmative Action 
actually has - not just the controversy about it, but the nature of that 
system - delayed the serious reckoning with the hierarchical and nar-
row understanding of merit that's reigned since the Civil War. So I 
thi~k it could be really exciting to rethink what kind of qualities a fi:ld 
or ~1r?' really. wants to select for. We could start developing a more so-
phisticated discourse about what we are up to and that in turn would 
mean .mu~h more clarity about the qualities that we want in the people 
we bring In. 
The police are a good example. It's becoming increasingly obvious 
that the narrow selective service tests that were brought in to eliminate 
nepotism in police forces don't really tell you who's going to be a good 
p~lice officer in a particular community. If you are policing a commu-
nity that speaks both English and Spanish or mostly Spanish, it's valu-
able for an officer to be able to speak Spanish. If police are evaluated 
only by their performance on these tests, then you may lose a lot of 
goo~ Spanish-speaking people; the test may punish the applicant for 
havmg the quality you're looking for. If, on the other hand, the physics 
department needs someone to solve math functions at high speed, give 
the applicants the GRE! So, it's becoming really obvious to a lot of 
people that we have to broaden out merit qualifications. I think we 
should lead the way in the university rather than lagging in that 
project. 
dC: You've been talking about these structures within the university, 
but what about the ways these structures operate within corporate 
structures, or the corporate world, as such? The current trend in diver-
sity management stresses individual difference in a way that fore-
grounds racial and ethnic color, which seems to fu rther reinforce liberal 
racism by legitimating the minorities without providing them access to 
power. Minorities are still operating under a power structure in which 
~he~ cannot participate, but the corporation gets the benefi t of saying it 
ts diverse. So, how do we get around that and what do you see going on 
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in diversity management that might be a more productive model? . 
CN: Yeah, well, there's bad news and there's good news arou~d this. 
The bad news is that corporate America has actually lagged beh~nd so-
ciety in terms of integration. It cannot present itself as a l~ader in ra~e 
relations in this way, although more and more peopl~ are in~erested m 
doing this, because it was first segregated and. no': is ena~ting ?ne of 
the major effects of liberal racism in promoting integration without 
equality - there are lots of people of color at lower le~els an,~ very fe:' 
at higher levels of most corporations. The Bush-appmnted glass ceil-
ing" commission found that about 96% of t~e inhabitants of corporate 
boardrooms are white males; the rest are white women and a few black 
men. h 
The good news, though, is that the people that work in uman r~-
sources are not old style liberal individualists, as are so ~any academic 
humanists. They come out of different intellectual traditions. Many of 
them are trained in the social sciences or business schools and they .get 
Ph.D.s in fields like social psychology, industrial psycholog~, organ~za­
tional development, organizational behavior. It sou.nd~ obv10u.s to Just 
say it, but they have actually worked group ?ehav1or into their, think-
ing. So they have an easier time understanding that somebody; g~n­
der, somebody's race, somebody's sexual pr~ference,. somebody s. first 
language, somebody's cultural background 1~ co~phcat~d ways is al-
ways with them on the job. They have an easier time seemg th?se fea-
tures not only as inevitable but also as assets that people can brmg to a 
company that would actually help the company or can help the group 
dynamics. So I think there's less of a conflict in div.ers~~ management 
(and this is the first good thing about it) between 1nd1v:dual freedom 
and group psychology, the private desires and the social factors. that 
make us who we are. There's less of a tendency to reduce us to rational 
actors, to the artistic solitary, or to his cousin, homo economicus, to the 
kind of political subjects that have served as the ideal of so much race-
phobic thinking. . . 
The second good thing is that a lot of the people that work in d1ve~­
sity management are people of color who not only have a lot ?f experi-
ence thinking very carefully and concretely about race experience b~t 
who also come out of the Civil Rights movement and are tntereste~ m 
continuing its basic work of racial integration. This is not a radical 
agenda, but it is still one that has not been accomplished in any sect~r 
of American society that I know of. So they have a pretty clear commit-
ment more so than most academics, to making the business world 
much more representative of society at large. I think t~at the co~ollary 
of that concern is that as corporations downsize, as society polarizes by 
economics, there's going to be a tendency for corporations to pull away 
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from society. That could mean they will become more inaccessible cita-
dels to people of color rather than more open to them. So as they see the 
market globalize and as they see a kind of shallow interest in d iversity 
taking hold and as they see polarization taking hold as well, some di-
versity managers want to make sure that there isn' t a new lockout as a 
result of those forces. This is a really hard row to hoe and I don' t want 
to underestimate the difficulty that they have or some of the limitations 
of their own thinking because I am so aware from my other work of the 
entrenched nature of racist thinking in middle-class and professional 
contexts. But I also have been very impressed with how focused, and in 
some ways even militant, they are about the need to pursue the integra-
tion agenda. Where we go from there is a whole separate story, but I 
would be sorry if left-wing culture people in the academy dismissed 
these diversity management folk because they are too corporate. 
dC: In your essay "What was Political Correctness: Race, the Right, and 
Managerial Democracy in the Humanities," you talk about how the 
university needs to replace its current managerial democracy with self-
direction and reconnect scholarship to politics. Then, in what you just 
said, you talk about the ways in which many academics reject corporate 
thinking because of their lack of certain political directions. What kind 
of changes do we need to eliminate liberal racism within the university 
and to allow us to work with the corporate sector to create a more inte-
grated and racially d iverse society? 
CN: Well, that's complicated because there are a lot of different terms 
working at once. The first thing I should say is that by this idea of re-
connecting scholarship to politics, I don't really mean that all scholar-
ship must be more politically engaged. I don't think that's true. I be-
lieve in knowledge for its own sake and I believe that a lot of times you 
really do have to disconnect your thinking from all sorts of conven-
tional structures in order to make it happen, and by that I mean not just 
depoliticizing it but trying to break with your conventional wisdom 
and your own situatedness. But there's also reconnection: we have to be 
less phobic about this situatedness, and other people's as well. So I 
would defend intellectual work that sees itself as personally motivated 
or having political outcomes and implications. I mean, I certainly see 
my own work on the limited forms of freedom and the unbelievable 
levels of inequality that we tolerate in the United States as motivated in 
part by my own general political belief, which is also an intellectual 
one, that the United States is going to have to get more egalitarian or 
it's going to go nowhere, it's going to stagnate as a society. So those 
things are always working with all of us and I would like more honesty 
about that. 
The other part of the answer is implicit in your question, which is 
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that one way of dealing with forms of liberal racism in the academy is 
by linking fear of race-coded difference with fear of full democracy. 
Academics favor a halfway covenant between forms of consent and 
participation that are simultaneously managed and controlled by 
people above. As you probably know from your own work in the uni-
versity, this is the structure of most of our existence. Faculty members 
are supposed to be on all sorts of committees where they spend huge 
numbers of hours doing work and participating and being involved 
and consulted but where they don't really have much power over the 
actual decision. I think that is psychologically very debilitating. We get 
used to impotence, used to lack of political sovereignty over even our 
own local structures, and we don' t expect any more. We become very 
cynical about participation, so we tend to withdraw at the first oppor-
tunity, which only accentuates the way the power circulates among cro-
nies and higher-ups in stratified systems. 
This is connected to racial attitudes because it habituates people to 
non-dissent. When you know the final decision is supposed to be made 
by somebody else, dissent just seems like trouble-making. It rattles 
people. It doesn't seem like the first step on the way to a new under-
standing that we' re all going to work out as a group. It just seems a 
shaking of the tree which is supposed to more and less stay the way 
that it is. Fear of dissent and fear of difference: they need to be con-
fronted at the same time. 
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